THE CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT
OF 2000: "RELIEF" FOR THE U.S. STEEL INDUSTRY;
TROUBLE FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE WTO
DANIEL M. LoPEz*
1.

INTRODUCTION

For years, companies seeking antidumping or countervailing
duty orders from the U.S. government have been strikingly successful because U.S. antidumping authorities are "able to apply
trade-reducing 'remedies' almost at will."' Since their inception in
1916,2 U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty ("AD/CVD")
laws have been among the most controversial of any economic
legislation. Critics argue that the U.S. laws are poor trade policy,
that they confer an unfair advantage on U.S. industries, and that
they are outright illegal. Whether these arguments are right or
wrong, they are being made ever more strongly since the entry into
force of the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000
("CDSOA," or "the new Act"), a recent amendment to the Tariff
Act of 1930 ("Tariff Act"). 4 According to CDSOA, the proceeds resulting from antidumping and countervailing duty investigations,
which previously were paid into the U.S. Treasury, are now paid

* J.D. Candidate 2002, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I would like
to thank and dedicate the following to Michael Sherman, for making this Comment (and a lot more) possible; my parents, for showing me, among other things,
how to think, how to write, and how to be; and to Marsha, my wife, for putting up
with me during the last three years, and for loving me as much as I love her.

1 BRIAN HINLEY & PARciK A- MESSERL]N, ANTDUMPiNG INDUSTRIAL PoLIcY:
LEGALIZED PROTECTIONISM IN THE WTO AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 52 (1996).
2 Title VIII of the Revenue Act of 1916 was the first U.S. law addressing
dumping by foreign competitors. See J. Michael Finger, The Origins and Evolution
of Antidumping Regulation, in ANTIDUMPING: How IT WORKS AND WHO GETS HURT
13,17-19 (J.Michael Finger ed., 1993).
3 Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1675c (West
Supp. 2001) [hereinafter CDSOA].
4 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1202-1681b (West 1999 & Supp. 2001)
[hereinafter Tariff Act].
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directly to the domestic companies who initiated those proceedings. 5
Section 2 of this Comment explains briefly the mechanisms of,
and principles behind, U.S. AD/CVD laws-both individually and
in conjunction with applicable provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")6 and the World Trade Organization ("WTO") agreements implementing GATT. Section 2
also explains the basic provisions of CDSOA. Section 3 discusses
some substantive and procedural weaknesses in the U.S. AD/CVD
laws. Finally, Section 4 examines the question whether CDSOA is
consistent with U.S. and international AD/CVD laws, concluding
that it is not.
2.

BACKGROUND OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL AD/CVD LAWS

2.1. Pre-CDSOA U.S. Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Laws
The purpose of the U.S. AD/CVD laws is "the restoration of
conditions of fair trade." 7 The following is a brief discussion of the
ways in which the U.S. laws supposedly identify and address disturbances in "conditions of fair trade."
2.1.1.

Mechanics of the U.S. AD/CVD Laws

The primary provisions in U.S. AD/CVD laws relating to
dumping and countervailable subsidies are contained in the Tariff
Act.8 The Tariff Act provides for the imposition of an antidumping
duty when two conditions are found to exist First, it must be
5 See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1675c(a) (West Supp. 2001).
6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXIS 485
(1994) [hereinafter GATT].
7 Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Pub. L No. 106-387,
sec. 1002(2), § 1(a), 114 Stat. 1549A-72 (2000).
8 The Tariff Act is not the only law that provides relief from dumping. Other
provisions include the Antidumping Act of 1916, which imposes "criminal and
civil penalties for the sale of imported articles at a price substantially less than the
actual market value.... ." COMMrITEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENATrvES, 105TH CONG., OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE
STATUrE, WMCP 105-4. at 65 (Comm. Print 1997) [hereinafter WMCP 105-4]; and
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ("OTCA"), which allows the
U.S. Trade Representative to initiate an action in a foreign country. See id.at 161.
However, the OTCA is not relevant here, and while the 1916 Act still is in effect,
only one private suit has ever been brought under it. See Finger, supra note 2, at
18-19.
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found that "a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is
likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value."9
Second, it must be found that (1) an industry in the United States is
either materially injured, or is threatened with such an injury; or

(2) the establishment of a U.S. industry is materially retarded by
imports or sales of that merchandise.10 Similar conditions must be
found before a countervailing duty may be imposed." In either

case, the determination regarding the first condition generally is
made by the U.S. Department of Commerce ("DOC"), and the determination regarding the second condition is made by the U.S.
International Trade Commission ("ITC").12
2.1.1.1.

3
Margin of Dumping/Subsidization1

Upon the initiation of an antidumping investigation or a countervailing duty investigation, the DOC and the ITC make prelimnary determinations as to whether dumping or subsidization has
occurred and whether injury has occurred.' 4 Provided that these

determinations are affirmative, and that certain procedural requirements are met, the investigation proceeds 5 and final determinations are made as to the margin by which the imported goods

9 19 U.S.CA. § 1673(1) (West 1999).
10 Id. § 1673(2). The determination whether injury has resulted is the target of
much of the criticism leveled against the U.S. laws. See infa, Section 3.2
1 First, it must be determined that "the government of a country or any public entity within the territory of a country is providing.., a countervailable subsidy." 19 U.S.C.A § 1671(a)(1) (West 1999). Unlike an investigation into alleged
dumping, however, in an inquiry into an allegedly countervailable subsidy a
showing that a U.S. industry is injured or threatened with injury is required only
where the merchandise is imported from a Subsidies Agreement country. See id. §
1673(2). A Subsidies Agreement country is a WTO member country or a country
with which the United States has relations of the kind defined in 19 U.S.C.A. §
1671(b).
12 The DOC and the ITC have promulgated extensive regulations regarding,
for example, classification of products as "like products" and the determination
whether sales by a foreign exporter are below fair value. See Antidumping and
Countervailing Duties, 19 CF.R. § 351 (2001).
13 Unless specifically noted, the discussion of the administration of dumping
subsidies and the imposition of countervailing duties will be discussed together.
14 See 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671b, 1673b (West 1999).
15 Note, however, that the Secretary of Commerce [hereinafter the Secretary]
may cause the termination of an investigation if he determines that termination is
in the "public interest." See id. § 1671c(a)(2)(A); 19 C.F.R. § 351.207(b) (2001).
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are being subsidized or dumped.16 The final "dumping margin" or
"subsidy margin" is the basis for the amount of the antidumping
duty or countervailing duty issued.17
The dumping margin is determined by comparing the export
price of the goods with their "normal value."18 Conceptually, in
terms of the Congressional purpose quoted above,19 "normal
value" represents the lowest price at which the foreign producer
could export the goods to the United States without disturbing
"conditions of fair trade."20 Naturally, the most objective and least
complex way to ascertain normal value would be to select a concrete figure that exists in the real world. Accordingly, the normal
value is determined, if possible, based on the price at which the
foreign producer sells the goods in question in that producer's
home market.21 Alternatively, if the producer does not sell the
goods in its home market, normal value can be determined from
the price of the producer's goods in some other market to which
the producer exports.22
A more complex process becomes necessary, however, when
neither a home-market value nor a third-market value can be
used.23 Regulations promulgated by the DOC allow for a "constructed value" to be used in certain specific circumstances, including where:
neither the home market nor a third country market is viable; sales below the cost of production are disregarded;
sales outside the ordinary course of trade, or sales the

16 Summary of Statutory Provisions Related to Import Relief, USITC Pub. No.
2944, at 1 (1996).
17 See WMCP 105-4, supra note 8, at 67.
18 See id
19 See supranote 7 and accompanying text.
20 In making a determination whether, and to what extent, dumping/subsidization has occurred, the Secretary must disregard de minimis infringements, which
are defined as countervailable subsidies where "the aggregate of the net countervailable subsidies is less than 1 percent [or dumping margins where the aggregate
is less than 2 percent] ad valorem or the equivalent specific rate for the subject
merchandise." 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671b(b)(4)(A), 1673b(b)(3) (West 1999).
21 See 19 C-F.R. § 351.404 (2001).
22 See id. § 351.404.
23 See id. §§ 351.404-351.405. Even if the goods are sold in the home market or
in a third market, the price of the goods in that market will not be used if sales in
both markets are insufficient to form a basis for comparison.
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prices of which are otherwise unrepresentative, are disregarded; sales used to establish a fictitious market are disregarded; no contemporaneous sales of comparable merchandise are available. 24
In addition to these relatively specific circumstances, the regulations allow the use of a constructed value "in other circumstances
where the Secretary determines that home market or third country
prices are inappropriate."25 The Secretary makes such a determination quite frequently (for example, where the product sold in the
foreign producer's home market is not "sufficiently-similar" to the
product allegedly being dumped by that producer in the United
States) .26

2.1.1.2.

Injury

Assuming that dumping or a countervailable subsidy is taking
place, an antidumping duty or a countervailing duty will not be
imposed absent a finding of material 27 injury, or threat thereof. 28 In
addition, the Tariff Act requires (ostensibly at least) that the harm
being suffered by the domestic industry is being caused by the
dumping or countervailable subsidy.29 Determining whether the
dumping or subsidy is causing the harm being suffered involves a
weighing of numerous factors, from market share and revenues to
wages and the ability of the allegedly affected companies to raise
capital.3 0
24

Id. § 351.405(a).

25

Id.

26

See Brink Lindsey, The U.S. Antidumping Law: Rhetoric Versus Reality, J.

WORLD TRADE,

OF

Feb. 2000, at 1, 6 n.13.

According to Department practice, a product sold in the comparison
market will normally not be considered 'comparable'... to a product
sold in the United States if the difference in variable manufacturing costs
between the two products is greater than 20 percent of the total manufacturing cost of the comparison-market product.

Id.
A showing merely that the domestic industry has been harmed is not suffident. 19 U.S.CA § 1671 (a)(2) (West 1999).
Remedial measures also are permissible
28 See id. §§ 1671(a)(2), 1673(2).
where the suspect activity injures or threatens to injure the establishment of an
27

industry. Id. § 1673 (2).
29

so

See WMCP 105-4, supra note 8, at 70.
See id.
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Regulation of Antidumping and CountervailingDuties
Under GA7T

The primary provision in GATT regarding the imposition of
antidumping and countervailing duties is Article VI. The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI ("ADA')3 and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("ASCM")32 clarify and supplement the terms of Article VI. The WTO Agreements
and GATT 1994 are incorporated into the U.S. international trade
laws.33 Therefore, the terms of Article VI, the ADA and the ASCM
apply to investigations by the DOC and the ITC as do the provisions of the Tariff Act and the ITC regulations discussed above.3
In substance, these provisions are very similar to the U.S. antidumping laws.35 Article VI defines dumping as the introduction of
31 See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1A, in THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:

THE

LEGAL TEXTS 168 (1994) [hereinafter ADA].
32 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 264 (1994) [hereinafter
ASCM].
33 See 19 U.S.C.A. § 3511 (West 1999).
34 "No provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with
any law of the United States shall have effect." 19 U.S.C.A. § 3512 (West 1999); see
also Matthew Schaefer, National Review of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: In the
Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced WTO Rule Compliance?, 11 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 307, 332-33 (1996).

Any amendment to a WTO agreement that would apply to the United
States requires the United States to consent to the amendment, with the
exception of those that are truly procedural and would not affect the
substantive rights or obligations of the United States. Indeed, the WTO
protects United States sovereignty in this regard to a greater degree than
its predecessor, the GATT, the de facto institution of the world trading
system for the past fifty years.
Id. (citations omitted).
35 See, e.g., Schaefer, supra note 34, at 329.
Unfortunately, rhetoric concerning sovereignty was raised to such a level
in the course of the Uruguay Round debate that reality was blurred....
The debate over sovereignty has falsely promoted the notion that our
citizenship interests are being exchanged for our consumer interests....
An alternative and more compelling explanation is that the WTO dispute
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goods into commerce "at less than [their] normal value."36 Furthermore, like the U.S. AD/CVD laws, Article VI allows remedial
action only if "the effect of the dumping or subsidization, as the
case may be, is such as to cause or threaten material injury to an
established domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially the
establishment of a domestic industry." 37 Like the U.S. laws, Article
VI authorizes alternatives to the price of the allegedly dumped
products in the home market as a basis for comparison: "In the absence of such domestic price," the price of the exported product
may be compared either to (1) "the highest comparable price for
the like product for export to any third country in the ordinary
course of trade," or (2) "the cost of production of the product in the
country of origin plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and
profit."38 The Antidumping Agreement sets forth specific guidelines regarding the imposition of antidumping duties under Article
VI of GATT, and the ASCM sets forth specific guidelines relating to
the imposition of countervailing duties under Article VI of GATT.39
2.1.3.

Purpose/Theoryof U.S. AD/CVD Laws

Proponents of U.S. AD/CVD laws traditionally have responded to their critics, in part, with the argument that the laws
are necessary to protect the economic interests of the United States,
whose markets are more open to foreign imports than those of any
other country in the world.40 In order for the global economy truly
to flourish, they argue, the high level of access to U.S. markets that
is granted to foreign exporters must be reciprocated. Those exporters' own governments must allow U.S. companies to compete
with their domestic companies on a level field of play.41 The absettlement system creates additional pressures against special protectionist interests that violate both our consumer and citizenship interests.

Id.
36

See GATT, supra note 6, art VI, para 1.

37

Id.

33 Id.
39 See, e.g., ADA, supra note 31, art. 2, para. 2-2 (regarding considerations in
calculating a constructed value for comparison where sales in the home market
are insufficient). The Antidumping Agreement and the ASCM are discussed in
greater detail below. See infra Section 4.2.
40 See generally 140 CoNG. REc. S5666 (daily edL May 12, 1994) (remarks of
Jeffery E. Garten).
41 145 CONG. REc S497 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999) (statement of Sen. DeWine)
("Simply being the best is not enough against foreign governments that either
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sence of this reciprocity (i.e., the failure of foreign governments to
allow U.S. companies to enter into their own domestic markets, or
the subsidization of companies which compete in with U.S. companies in U.S. markets) enables the foreign exporters to engage in
unfair trade practices that could potentially drive U.S. companies
out of business.42
2.1.3.1.

Dumping

When foreign exports are prevented from entering a country's
markets, a "sanctuary market" is created for domestic producers of
the product in question. With no competition, the domestic producers are free to charge higher prices for their products than they
would in an open market.43 The producers then can sell their
products at very low prices (i.e., "dump" them) in the U.S. market,
offsetting the resulting losses with high profit margins earned in
the home "sanctuary" market, and driving their U.S. competitors
out of business.44
2.1.3.2.

Subsidization

Foreign producers also may be able to undersell competitors in
the U.S. market, even if their home market welcomes outside competition, by receiving financial assistance from their government.
This financial assistance, it is argued, provides the same benefit to
foreign exporters as a closed market it gives them the ability to
charge unreasonably low prices in the U.S. market. The subsidized
foreign producers offset the resulting losses, not with high profit

erect barriers to keep U.S. steel out, or subsidize their exports to distort prices.
That's why we have trade laws designed to promote fair trade."). Senator
DeWine was a co-sponsor of CDSOA.
42 See id.
This surge in imports is having a direct impact on our own steel industry.... We have seen U.S. steeYs industrial utilization rate fall from
93.1% in March of 1998 to 73.9% in January of 1999. And most troubling
of all, approximately 10,000 jobs have been lost in our steel industry since
last year. More layoffs are certain

Id.
43 See GREG MAsrEL, ANTIDUMPING LAWS AND THE U.S. ECONoMY 5 (1998) ("A
dosed home market allows companies to charge high prices at home because they
face no foreign competition.").
44 See supra note 41.
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margins earned in their home sanctuary market, but with the subsidies.

2.1.3.3.

The U.S. Laws' Response

The U.S. AD/CVD laws, proponents argue, are "a defensive in-

strument needed as an effective response to market distortions
abroad which create or foster unfairly priced and injurious exports

to the United States."45 The creation of sanctuary markets and the
provision of countervailable subsidies46 are examples of "market

distortions," 47 and U.S. AD/CVD laws respond to them, in theory,
by offsetting the benefit they provide to the foreign exporters with

an equivalent cost, in the form of an antidumping duty or a countervailing duty. A foreign producer selling goods in the U.S. mar-

ket at prices lower than the prices at which the producer sells the
same goods in another market (for example, its home market) will
be susceptible to an antidumping duty48 or,49 if the price differen-

tial is facilitated by a subsidy from the producer's government, a
countervailing duty.50
2.2. The ContinuedDumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000

CDSOA was signed into law by President Clinton on October
18, 2000.51 The effect of the new Act is, quite simply, to put the
proceeds from antidumping duties and countervailing duties di-

rectly in the treasuries of the corporations for whose benefit the

140 CONG. REC. S5666, S5670, supra note 40.
The distinction between subsidies that are countervailable and those that
are not, is defined by the statutes and the WTO Agreement, discussed below.
47 See Lindsey, supra note 26, at 2 ("Dumping... results from interventionist
government policies and structural differences between national economies.
Those market distortions allegedly give foreign firms an unfair competitive advantage.").
4s See WMCP 105-4, supranote 8, at 65.
49 See GATT, supra note 6, art. VI, para. 5 ("No product of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall
be subject to both anti-dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for the
same situation of dumping or export subsidization.").
50 See WMCP 105-4, supranote 8 at 65.
45

46

51 On signing the bill, President Clinton urged Congress "to override [the]
provision, or amend it to be acceptable" before the close of the 106th session.
President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations

Act, 2001 (Oct 28,2000).
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duties (the "underlying duties") are imposed 2 According to
Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), who inserted the provision into the
FY 2000 Agriculture Appropriations bill, U.S. companies would
have received approximately $39 million worth of these duties in
1999 had the provision been in effect.53 A company is eligible to receive a pro rata portion of the payments made under CDSOA
("offsets" or "distributions") if: (1) that company was a petitioner
4
or an interested party in the proceedings resulting in the duty;
and (2) that company remains in operation.55 The "catch" is that
each recipient's pro rata share of the proceeds is calculated according to that recipient's share of "qualifying expenditures."56

That is, a complainant company in a AD/CVD action will receive
money only if it has made qualifying expenditures, and it will receive only the amount equal to its pro rata portion of the total
qualifying expenditures made by all the complainants in the action.57 This caveat in CDSOA presumably is designed to give the
provision the flavor of "compensation." This Comment makes the
argument that, on the contrary, CDOSA offsets are compensatory,

ff at all, in form only.5 8
52

See 19 U.S.C.A_ § 1675c(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2001).

53

Michael M. Phillips, Dumping Provision in Bill Puts Clinton at Odds with Un-

ion Voters Gore Needs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2000, at AZ It is likely, however, that
the total amount of duties imposed is significantly higher-perhaps as high as
$250 million. See Somporn Thapanachai, THAI-US TRADE: 'Cash Prizes' in New
Law Threaten Exports, BANGKOK PosT, Nov. 14, 2000, availableat 2000 WL 26697353.
54 See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1675c(b)(1).
- See id. § 1675c(b)(4).
56 See id. §§ 1675c(a), 1675c(b)(4).
57 CDSOA lists several categories of "qualifying expenditures."
See id. §
1675c(b)(4). This "qualification" is not discussed in the remainder of this Comment, because it does not meaningfully affect the analysis. Most, and perhaps all,
of the listed expenditures are expenditures that a petitioning company incurs constantly in the ordinary course of its business. Because the recipients of CDSOA
offsets would, without these funds, incur these expenses anyway, the requirement
that the offsets be distributed only to the extent of these expenditures is meaningless. Money, after all, is fungible. Having devoted the offsets to manufacturing
facilities, equipment, research and development, personnel training, or any of the
other listed purposes, the recipient will have an amount equal to the amount of
the offset to use in whatever way it wishes.
58 CDSOA does not distinguish "qualifying expenditures" from "injury" that
the underlying duties were calculated to redress. To the extent that the injury is
fully redressed by the underlying duties, there is no place within the framework
of GATf for an additional distribution to the complainant companies, regardless
what eligibility requirements are attached to the distributions. See generally infra
Section 4.
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PRE-CDSOA U.S. AD/CVD LAWS: ACCEPTABLE,
EVEN IF BIASED

Two fundamental concerns underlie the criticisms made of U.S.
antidumping and countervailing duty laws- one is conceptual and
one is practical. In The U.S. Antidumping Law: Rhetoric vs. Reality,5 9
Brink Lindsey touches on both of these issues:
It is beyond the scope of this article to explore ... whether
the distinction between 'natural' and 'artificial' competitive
advantages is intellectually coherent, and whether erecting
trade barriers against imports that enjoy... advantages
characterized as artificial constitutes sound trade policy or
indeed promotes fairness in any meaningful sense of that
term. The aim here is narrower: it is simply to examine
whether the reality of antidumping practice matches its
rhetoric. Are the antidumping duties, for better or worse,
really offsetting the effects of market-distorting government
policies? 60
In simpler terms, these two issues are: (1) whether the conditions sought to be remedied by the U.S. laws really are "unfair"
and, thus, whether they ought to be remedied in the first place;
and, even assuming that these allegedly unfair conditions really are
unfair, (2) whether the U.S. laws effectively detect and counter
them, rather than making things worse by disturbing conditions of
fair trade themselves.
Section 3.1 briefly addresses the first question. It offers no answer, but only a suggestion about how to approach the problem.
A great deal of the literature discussing this problem assumes that
the purpose of the U.S. AD/CVD laws is to ferret out and neutralize the effects of sanctuary markets and price discrimination. From
this assumption, many critics proceed with statistical data and
other evidence showing that the U.S. laws do not do this, concluding that the U.S. laws are poor trade policy with little or no
additional justification. In addressing Lindsey's first question, this
line of attack is too narrow conceptually. Section 3.2 addresses the
second question in some detail.

59
60

Lindsey, supra note 26.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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3.1. Are the Conditions Sought to Be Remedied by the U.S. Laws
Really Problematic?
The U.S. AD/CVD laws, including CDSOA, are designed expressly to enhance conditions of fair trade.6' Opponents of the
laws allege that the conditions the U.S. laws remedy are not "unfair" at a11. 62 Rather than resulting from a sanctuary market or
price discrimination, opponents argue, low-cost sales by foreign
exporters may result from normal business practices-practices
engaged in by U.S. companies every day. 63 As Hindley points out
in Antidumping Industrial Policy, a foreign producer's exporting a
product to the United States at less than that producer's average
cost may result simply from excess production capacity, 64 different
employment practices, 65 or temporary start-up costs that, for competitive reasons, it cannot afford to pass on to its customers. 66 Diminishing excess capacity and "eating" excessive startup costs are
innocent, even beneficial market phenomena. Nevertheless, that
producer could potentially be subject to a remedial duty under
U.S. laws.6 7 In simpler terms, the argument goes something like

this: (1) Subsidies and/or sales at below "fair value" sometimes
occur even though there is no sanctuary market or price discrimination; (2) therefore, antidumping and countervailing dutieswhich under U.S. laws are imposed on the basis of the existence of
subsidies and/or sales at below fair value-are imposed, at least
61

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

62 It should be noted that not all subsidization is deemed actionable by U.S.

and international laws. See Richard Boltuck & Robert E.Litan, America's "Unfair"
Trade Laws, in DowN IN THE DumpS: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAWS 1,
8-9 (Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
63 See HINDLEY & MESSERLIN, supra note 1, at 11 (explaining that, although
they often capture situations of price discrimination or sanctuary markets,
"[c]urrent antidumping laws... can be applied in a vastly broader range of circumstance").
64 See id. at 11-12.
65 Seeid. at 13.
66 See id. at 13-14.
67 See Lindsey, supra note 26, at 9.
A finding of dumping using constructed value offers no evidence of the
existence of a sanctuary home market. All that such a finding can show
is that US sales are being made below some baseline level of profitability;
it cannot show that home-market sales are above any similar baseline, as
home-market sales are excluded from the dumping calculation.
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sometimes, even though there is no sanctuary market or price discrimination; (3) therefore, U.S. laws are bad.
The problem with this reasoning is that it does not address the
argument that sales by foreign producers in the United States at
below the producers' cost of production are wrong for some other
reason-perhaps such sales are wrong per seA8 or perhaps they are
wrong for some other specific reason that has little or nothing to do
with sanctuary markets or price discrimination.69 Many critics of
the U.S. laws make this mistake. They evaluate the U.S. laws only
in terms of the rhetoric offered by the laws' advocates.
To be sure, the rhetoric and literature supporting U.S. antidumping laws employ concepts like "sanctuary markets" and
"price discrimination." Even if these concepts are the most effective tools with which to entice undecided Members of Congress to
vote for legislation such as CDSOA, however, they are a poor standard by which to evaluate CDSOA and the other U.S. AD/CVD
laws. These laws are not intended to reveal "price discrimination"
and "sanctuary markets." Rather, they are intended to reveal sales
at below fair value,70 and subsidies,7 respectively. The wording of
the statute indicates that perhaps Congress has determined that
sales at below fair value are worth preventing whether they result
from price discrimination, sanctuary markets, or some other condition or conditions.
Accordingly, it is not logical to leap from the fact that antidumping and countervailing duties are imposed, at least sometimes even though there is no sanctuary market or price discrimination, to the conclusion that, therefore, the U.S. laws are bad. The

65 Conceptually, the law would be fully justified under the theory that sales
below fair value are wrong per se. Of course, if selling below cost is wrong per se,
then remedies available to U.S. companies to compensate for below-cost selling by
foreign producers should also be available to compensate for below-cost selling
by other U.S. producers. That argument, however, is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
69 Boltuck and Litan explain that simple protectionism may be a valid motivation for AD/CVD regulation. See Boltuck & titan, supra note 62, at 10 (explaining that if firms do not enjoy home market protection they may be driven out
of business and rendered unable to return).
70 See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673 (West 1999) ("[i]f... the administering authority
determines that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be,
sold in the United States at less than its fair value. .. ").
7' See id. § 1671 ("[i]f... the administering authority determines that the government of a country... is providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable subsidy...").
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question should not be whether sales at below fair value or the existence of subsidies are a reliable proxy for the existence of sanctuary markets or price discrimination; the question should be
whether sales at below fair value or the existence of subsidies are a
reliable proxy for any condition or conditions which U.S. international trade laws ought to discourage.
Assuming that subsidies and sales below fair value really do
correspond to conditions of unfair trade-sanctuary markets, price
discrimination, or some other conditions-a conceptual question
remains, according to Lindsey, whether it is appropriate to remedy
those problems:
Granted, cheap imports are capable of injuring specific import-competing firms; those same cheap imports, however,
just as clearly benefit the U.S. companies that buy and use
them, not to mention the millions of consumers who buy
from those companies. So why is it appropriate to sacrifice
72
the interests of some Americans to the interests of others?
In response to this, supporters of the U.S. Laws such as Jeffrey
Garten, former Undersecretary of Commerce for International
Trade, have argued that although cheap imports may seem like a
benefit to U.S. consumers, the benefit is only short-term.73 In the
long run, those cheap imports will result in (1) unemployment, as
U.S. producers are driven out of business; and (2) higher priceswhen the foreign producers have no competition, they will have no
incentive to continue selling their products at below fair value. 74
This debate, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
3.2. Question Two: Do the U.S. Laws Effectively Detect and Counter
Such Conditions?
The most obvious biases built into the U.S. remedial scheme are
the conceptual flaws discussed above: U.S. laws allow remedies in
response to practices that can be normal business practices,5 and
the laws single out foreign companies. 76 Neither of these qualities
72

Lindsey, supra note 26, at Z

73

See supra note 40.

74 See id.
75
76

See generally supra Section 3.1.
See supra note 68.
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makes sense except in light of a protectionist bias toward U.S. producers. Even at the outset, therefore, it seems getting to the courthouse (or, in this case, filing a petition with the DOC) is half the
battle.77 This contention is supported by the high success rate of
petitions filed by U.S. producers. 78
Other, more concrete biases are built into the U.S. remedial
scheme by the specific provisions relating to the determination
whether dumping or countervailable subsidization is occurring.

Once again, a dumping or subsidy margin is ascertained, essentially, by subtracting the foreign export price (the price at which
the goods are sold in the United States) from the normal value.79
When using the foreign producer's home market to determine the
normal value, a "weighted average" is taken of the prices at which
the foreign producer sells the product in that home market.8 0 In

computing that average, however, "[s]ales made at less than cost of
production may be disregarded... under certain circumstances."81
Obviously, to the extent lower sale prices are disregarded from the
computation, the average of the sale prices that are included in the
2
computation, and hence the normal value, will be higher.8

77 It should be noted that this half of the battle is not insignificant The DOC
and the ITC will not even proceed with the preliminary stages of the investigation
unless the petitioners have standing, and the statutory requirements for standing
are substantial. In particular, (1) the domestic producers or workers who support
the petition [must] account for at least [twenty-five] percent of the total production of the domestic like product; and (2) the domestic producers or workers who

support the petition [must] account for more than [fifty] percent of the production
of the domestic like product produced by that portion of the industry expressing
support for or opposition to the petition. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673a(c)(4)(A) (West 1999).
78 Of the 778 total antidumping and countervailing duty cases filed in the
United States from 1980-1988, 543 (69.8%) resulted in restrictions of the foreign
trade in question. See Finger, supra note 2, at 251-54.
79 See supra Section 21.1.1.
80 See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673b(d)(1)(A) (West 1999); see also WMCP 105-4, supra

note 8, at 67.
81 WMCP 1054, supra note 8, at 67. See also 19 C.F.R. § 351.405 (2001);
Lindsey, supra note 26, at 6 (explaining that "[i]f more than 20 percent of comparison-market prices of a particular model are below cost, Commerce will exclude all
the below-cost sales of that model from its calculations [pursuant to 19 C.F.R. §
351.405] on the ground that they are 'outside the ordinary course of trade."').
82 See Tracy Murray, The Administration of the Antidumping Duty Law by the
Department of Commerce, in DowN IN THE DuMps: ADMINIsTRATION OF THE UNFAIR

23,39 (Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) ("The petitioners
understand the effect of this provision on the margin of dumping and consequently repeatedly allege that certain home market sales are below the costs of
production.").
TRADE LAws

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[23:2

Just as there is a built-in bias which tends to make normal
value higher, there is also a built-in bias which tends to make the
foreign export price lower. In determining the foreign export price,
subtractions are made (in certain circumstances) for "selling commissions, indirect selling expenses, and expenses and profit for
further manufacturing in the United States [and] ... for related
party profit, if any, earned in a sale through a related distributor to
an end-user in the United States." 83 The result of these two biases
is a wider-perhaps artificiallywider-gapbetween the export price
of the goods in question and the normal value of those goods, or,
in other words, a larger dumping or subsidization margin.
Another bias enters the process at the injury stage of the investigation, particularly with respect to causation. The difficulty that
has opened the door for this bias is well stated by Hindley as follows: "That dumping has occurred can in principle be demonstrated. That a domestic industry displays symptoms of injury can
in principle be demonstrated. But those observations together do
not demonstrate that the dumping has caused the injury."84 Historically, the ITC has shifted between different tests regarding the
injury sustained by domestic producers as a result of dumping or
countervailable subsidies. One test that has been applied asks
whether, but for the dumping or subsidies, the domestic industry
would be better off than it is in fact.85 Another test asks both (1)
whether the U.S. industry is in a substandard or deteriorating condition; and if so, (2) whether the dumping or subsidies are a factor
in that condition.86
Regardless of which test is applied, establishing a causal connection between the dumping or subsidies and the alleged injury
to the U.S. domestic industry is extremely difficult. This is primarily because, as mentioned above, there are perhaps infinite factors
and indicators that can be taken into consideration in determining
injury. The ADA provisions on causation are an ideal illustration
of the complexity in evaluating injury and its link to particular foreign imports. In Article 3 of the Agreement ("Determination of
Injury") the Agreement requires an examination of:

83 WMCP 105-4, supra note 8, at 67-68.
84

HINDLEY & MEssERLIN, supra note 1, at 17.

85 See Boltuck & Litan, supra note 62, at 19.
86

See id.
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all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing
on the state of the industry, including actual and potential
decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity,
return on investments, [and] utilization of capacity; factors
affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of
dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash
flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to
raise capital or investments.8 7
In addition to this unwieldy set of considerations (which the
Agreement points out is not exhaustive), the Agreement also requires an examination of factors which might affect the condition
of the domestic industry, but which are not attributable to the
dumping, so that none of the injury resulting from those factors is
attributed to the dumped imports. 88 Those factors include "the
volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, traderestrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and
domestic producers, developments in technology and the export
performance and productivity of the domestic industry."89
In applying these irreconcilably-complex standards regarding
the injury criterion, the nature of U.S. antidumping law becomes
quite clear: "When the politics of the matter compel action against
imports, the legal definition of dumping can be stretched to accommodate it"90 As explained below, 91 however, even the malleable U.S. AD/CVD laws cannot be interpreted soundly to support
CDSOA.
3.3. Bottom Line: Pre-CDSOA U.S. AD/CVD Laws Are Susceptible
to Criticismas Applied, but Are Not Faulty PerSe
Who can be trusted to be brutally honest in criticizing the U.S.
AD/CVD laws but the fellow WTO Members against whom they
are administered. A look at the challenges that have been made
against the U.S. laws in the WTO indicates that, while the biases
discussed above leave plenty of room for errors in administering
87

See ADA, supra note 31, art. 3, para. 3.4.

88 Id. art. 3, para. 3.5.
89 Id.

90 Finger, supranote 2, at viii.
91 See infta Section 4.
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the laws, the basic concept is sound. With the exception of the Antidumping Act of 1916, U.S. AD/CVD laws generally are not attacked in WTO dispute settlement proceedings as "illegal" or "invalid" under the terms of the Final Act 92 Rather, the challenges
leveled against the U.S. laws relate to their application-to the validity or amount of the particular antidumping and countervailing
duties that are imposed.
As noted above, the U.S. laws are very similar to the provisions
of the Final Act 9 3 The definition of dumping is extremely similar,
the requirement of injury or threatened injury is contained in both,
and the use of a constructed or substitute value with which to
compare the price of the exported goods in question is permitted in
both. An important difference between the Final Act and the U.S.
laws, however, is the methodology prescribed by the ADA regarding how the determinations that lead to the imposition of a
remedial measure are to be made. 94 These prescriptions are extremely significant in conjunction with the standard of review used
in dispute settlement proceedings in which the United States is a
respondent.
Article 11 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 95 provides the standard of review
with regard to "consultations and the settlement of disputes between Members concerning their rights and obligations under the
provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization... and of this Understanding taken in isolation or in combination with any other covered agreement."96 Under that article,
"a panel has the authority to determine for itself the facts and the
law of the case, and is not required to defer to an administering
authority's assessment of the facts or its interpretation of the cov-

92 The term "illegal" would be a misnomer. A U.S. law or regulation, or a decision made pursuant to a U.S. law or regulation, cannot be "illegal" as such, because "WTO dispute settlement panel reports or appellate body reports are not
self-executing and do not change United States law. Congressional action, in concert with or over the veto of the President, remains the exclusive avenue to change
United States law." Schaefer, supranote 34, at 330 (footnote omitted).
93 See supraSection 21.2.
94 See ADA, supra note 31, arts. 2-3 (regarding determination of dumping and
determination of injury, respectively).
95 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2 [hereinafter DSU].
96 Id.
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ered agreements."9 7 The Antidumping Agreement, however, contains its own provisions regarding the standard of review to be applied in cases involving Article VI and the Antidumping Agreement In contrast to the above-quoted provision of Article II, the
ADA provides:
(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall
determine whether the authorities' establishment of the
facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts
was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the
facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned;

(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the
Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds
that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more
than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the
authorities' measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations. 98
There is as yet only limited case law applying these provisions
in evaluating U.S. AD/CVD measures,9 9 and it seems practitioners
disagree whether the future of U.S. laws under the WTO system

will be bleak or robust

00

For the purposes of this Comment, how-

97 Paul C Rosenthal & Robert T.C Vermylen, The WTOAntidurapingand Subsidies Agreements: Did the United States Achieve Its Objectives During the Uruguay
Round?, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 871, 873 (2000).
98 ADA, supra note 31, art 17, para. 17.6.
99 A Westlaw search of all Panel and Appellate Body reports with respect to
which the United States was a respondent yields only fifty-two of the former and
ten of the latter.
10D See, e.g., Richard Cunningham, Commentary on the First Five Years of the

WTO Antidumping Agreement and Agreement on Subsidies and CountervailingMeasures,31 LAW & Po.'Y INTf Bus. 897, 901 (2000).
It was feared that the hostility of most WTO member nations to U.S. antidumping practice would result in decision after decision overturning
the results of U.S. cases. Additionally, under the new procedures the

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[23:2

ever, that debate need not be resolved. From the cases that do exist, it is clear that opponents of particular trade remedies imposed
under the U.S. laws generally do not dispute the validity of the preCDSOA U.S. AD/CVD laws, but only their implementation. Further, in settling these disputes, WTO authorities give substantial
deference to the DOC and ITC.
4.

CDSOA: STEPPING OVER THE LINE

While fervent disagreement will continue over the conceptual
motivations of the U.S. AD/CVD laws, and over the particulars of
their administration, the basic concept seems legitimate.101 The
same cannot be said about CDSOA.
4.1. Introduction: An Economic Assumption
Proponents of CDSOA have argued that the CDSOA offsets
need not be justified in terms of the provisions of GATT relating to
antidumping duties and subsidies. This argument stems from the
notion that CDSOA distributions merely represent a choice by the
U.S. government regarding how to dispose of the underlying duties. As one practitioner put it, "ITWhe Byrd amendment makes no
change to current U.S. dumping and countervailing duty laws.
'This is about the U.S. government.., deciding what is going to be
done with government revenues."1 02 On its merits alone, this argument, which apparently equates the autonomy of the U.S. government with immunity from the provisions of GATT, deserves
little attention. However, it provides a convenient context in
United States would no longer be able to block the adoption of adverse
panel reports. It has not turned out that way at all.... The United States
obtained agreement for a higher standard of review where panels considered the validity of a member nation's antidumping decision. In essence, the panel must give considerable deference to the agency's deterrination.
Id.; cf Rosenthal & Vermylen, supra note 97, at 881-82 ("There have been few decisions interpreting the Antidumping and ASCM Agreements since the creation of
the WTO. The decisions to date, however, raise questions about the willingness of
panels to adhere to the appropriate standard of review.").
101 That basic concept is the following- determine whether an unfair practice
is occurring, then determine by what amount that practice is having an unfair impact, then impose a remedy commensurate with that amount.
102 See Rossella Brevetti, Dumping: Byrd Amendment Raises NAFTA Issues, Attorney Says, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Jan 18, 2001, at D10 (quoting Roger B. Schagrin, Schagrin & Associates).
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which to introduce some basic concepts which will be relied on in
the following discussion of CDSOA's validity under GATT and its
value in terms of U.S. trade policy.
It is true, of course, that CDSOA distributions are about the
U.S. government deciding what is going to be done with government revenues. It is also true, however, that when a foreign government pays subsidies to its exporting companies, those subsidies
are about that government deciding what is to be done with its
own revenues. Both types of payments are subject to scrutiny under GATT. The reason is not that WTO member countries must get
permission from their fellow WTO member countries before implementing decisions about what to do with their revenues.
Rather, the reason is that WTO member countries are mutually
bound under a system that regulates activities affecting the balance
of fairness in international trade, and, intentionally or not, that is
precisely what CDSOA distributions do.
The difference between CDSOA "offsets," on the one hand, and
"subsidies," on the other, is a distinction in name only. If a subsidy
received by a foreign exporter improves the position of that company vis-a-vis its U.S. competitors, then "offsets" received by a U.S.
company improve the position of that U.S. company vis-a-vis its
foreign competitors.'O3 That CDSOA distributions improve the position of the U.S. companies who receive them does not mean,
however, that the offsets violate GATT or U.S. AD/CVD laws; it
means only that the offsets fall within the reach of those provisions. The more important question is whether they improve the
position of U.S. companies who receive them too much. Having
dispensed with the argument that the offsets are "immune" from
scrutiny under GATT, this Comment now will address this more
complicated question.104

103 Not only does this fact underlie the argument articulated in this Comment, it also underlies the AD/CVD laws of the United States and of GAIT.
However, the particular situation described here-in which money is distributed
by the government to domestic producers to remedy their unfair position relative to
their foreign competitors, is not the situation with which the U.S. AD/CVD laws
are concerned. Rather, they are concerned with the situation in which money is
distributed to domestic producers even though they are not at a disadvantagerelative
to their foreign competitors. The effect of the offsets in each case is the same.
Only their name is different: in the former situation they are "remedial"; in the
latter situation they are "unfair."
104 1 use the term "complicated" loosely. Although the question whether
CDSOA distributions are excessive in this way is complicated relative to the
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It is not within the scope of this Comment (nor is it within the
expertise of the author) to demonstrate exactly how much a
CDSOA distribution improves the position of a U.S. company who
receives it. Conveniently, however, it is also not necessary in the
analysis that follows to do so. Nevertheless, for the sake of illustration, assigning a value will be useful. Therefore, the following
discussion, at times, will incorporate the following assumption:
one dollar paid as a CDSOA offset to a U.S. company, "A," improves the position of A vis-A-vis its foreign competitor company,
"B," to the same extent that one dollar paid to B by its government
improves the position of B vis-A-vis A. If this is true, and if the U.S.
AD/CVD laws are correct in positing that the one dollar payment
to B (e.g., as a subsidy) has an effect equal to a one dollar duty
charged B (e.g., as a countervailing duty), then the following corollary is true: one dollar paid as a CDSOA offset to A improves the
position of A vis-A-vis B to the same extent as a one dollar duty
charged B.105
4.2. Evaluating CDSOA Under GATT and the WTO Agreements
On January 9, 2001, Australia, Brazil, Chile, the European
Communities, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Thailand fied a
request for consultations with the United States regarding CDSOA.
This request for consultations alleges the following:
The [Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset] Act seems to
be inconsistent with the obligations of the United States
under: (1) Article 18.1 of the ADA, in conjunction with Article VI:2 of the GATT and Article 1 of the ADA; (2) Article
32.1 of the ASCM, in conjunction with Article VI.3 of the
GATT and Articles 4.10, 7.9 and 10 of the ASCM; (3) Article
X (3)(a) of the GATT; (4) Article 5.4 of the ADA and Article
11.4 of the ASCM; (5) Article 8 of the ADA and Article 18 of
the ASCM; and (6) Article XVI.4 of the Marrakesh Agree-

question whether CDSOA is immune from scrutiny under GATT, in absolute
terms the question seems, to the author, decidedly uncomplicated.
10- Again, it is not necessary that this assumption be correct down to the
penny. Firstly, as explained below, there is ample room for error. Secondly, much
of the following discussion does not rely on this assumption at all.
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ment establishing the WTO, Article 18.4 of the ADA and

Article 32.5 of the ASCM.106
On June 1, 2001, Canada and Mexico filed a second request for
consultations, alleging similar violations of GATT.107 Argentina
and Guatemala have requested to join in these consultations.108 As
these requests for consultations make clear, the ADA and the
ASCM present two alternative approaches for challenging CDSOA
(or for defending it, as the case may be). The first approach is to
conceive of CDSOA offsets as a remedial measure taken in response to conditions of unfair trade. If this approach is taken,
CDSOA distributions must satisfy the substantive and procedural
requirements of Article VI of GATT, the ADA, and the ASCM regarding the imposition of antidumping duties and countervailing
duties. The second approach is to conceive of CDSOA offsets as
subsidies, in which case they must avoid the provisions of Article
VI and the ASCM which prohibit certain subsidies.
4.2.1.

CDSOA as a Remedial Measure

CDSOA offsets are often defended as a remedial measure-i.e.,
an extra "kick" necessary to make the underlying duties really
work.109 If the underlying duties generally are insufficient, as
many of the beneficiaries of CDSOA offsets allege, to remedy the
harm caused by the dumping or subsidies which the underlying
duties are designed to remedy, some additional remedy may indeed be necessary.
Article VI and the related agreements, however, require more
than simply that "some additional remedy may indeed be neces-

106 Request for Consultations by Australia, Brazil, Chile, the European Communities, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Thailand, United States-Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 2001 WL 21481, at *2 (Jan. 9, 2001); see
also id ("The Act appears to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to Australia,
Brazil, Chile, the EC, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Thailand under the cited
agreements in the manner described in Article XXIIL1(a) of GATT.").
107 See Request for Consultations by Canada and Mexico, United StatesContinued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 2001 WL 587629 (June 1,

2001).
103 See Request to Join Consultations, United States-Continued Dumping
and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 2001 WL 32553 (Jan. 15, 2001); Request to Join
Consultations, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of

2000,2001 WL 649885 (June 12,2001).

109 See, e.g., supra note 41 ("This legislation is designed to ensure that our domestic producers can compete freely and fairly in global markets.").
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sary" -i.e., that the remedy be qualitativelyjustified. They require,
further, that the remedy be appropriate in amount-i.e., that the
remedy be quantitatively justified." 0 The requirements of GATT
(and of the U.S. AD/CVD laws, for that matter) are quite specific
and quite demanding regarding (1) the amount of the remedy ultimately imposed,"' and (2) the adequacy of the investigation that
leads to the remedial action." 2 CDSOA offsets fall short of both
these requirements.

4.2.1.1.

CDSOA Offsets Are Necessarily Excessive in
Amount; They More than "Offset" the Harm Caused
by Dumping and Subsidization

With respect to the allowable amount of an a remedy in response to dumping, Article VI, para. 2 of GATT provides:
In order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party
may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty
not greaterin amount than the margin of dumping in respect of
110 See, e.g., ASCM, supra note 32, art. 7, para. 7.9In the event the Member has not taken appropriate steps to remove the
adverse effects of the subsidy or withdraw the subsidy within six months
from the date when the DSB adopts the panel report or the Appellate
Body report, and in the absence of agreement on compensation, the DSB
shall grant authorization to the complaining Member to take countermeasures, commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist, unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request
(emphasis added).
Id.
111 Id. art 19, para. 19.4 ("No countervailing duty shall be levied on any imported product in excess of the amount of the subsidy found to exist, calculated in
terms of subsidization per unit of the subsidized and exported product"); id. at
para 19.2 ("The decision whether the amount of the countervailing duty to be imposed shall be the full amount of the subsidy or less, are decisions to be made by the
authorities of the importing Member.") (emphasis added); see also ADA, supra
note 31, art. 9, para. 9.3 ("The amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed
the margin of dumping as established under Article 2.").
112 See, e.g., ASCM, supra note 32, art 2, para. 24 ("Any determination of
specificity under the provisions of this Article shall be clearly substantiated on the
basis of positive evidence."); art 11 (requiring that an investigation be initiated
only "upon written application by or on behalf of the domestic industry," except
as provided in paragraph 11.6); art 11, para. 11.6 (providing that the authorities
concerned may proceed with an investigation absent a written application "only if
they have sufficient evidence of the existence of a subsidy, injury and causal
link"). See also ADA, supra note 31, art. 5.
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such product. For the purposes of this Article, the margin of
dumping is the price difference determined in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 1.113
With regard to the allowable amount of an action against actionable subsidies, Article VI, para. 3 provides:
No countervailingduty shall be levied on any product of the
territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of another contracting party in excess of an amount equal
to the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been
granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export of such product in the country of origin or

exportation ....

"-114

The limitation on the amount of any remedial measure-be it
an antidumping duty or a countervailing duty-is repeated frequently throughout the ASCM and the Antidumping Agreement.
Effectively, these limitations impose a "cap" on the amount of a
country's response to dumping or a countervailable subsidy, and
that cap is equal to the margin of dumping or of subsidization as
defined in GATT, the Agreements, and the imposing country's
trade regulatory laws.
Conceptually, this "cap" makes perfect sense. As discussed
above"15 U.S. AD/CVD laws are based on the premise that certain
trade practices, including government subsidies and sanctuary
markets, put foreign companies who export to the United States at
an unfair advantage vis-a-vis their U.S. competitors. For example,
government subsidies effectively lower the production costs of the
companies who receive them. As a result, those foreign companies
will have a higher profit margin than their U.S. competitors who
receive no subsidization. The U.S. laws adjust this "unfair" discrepancy by (1) determining the amount by which the foreign exporters are benefiting unfairly as a result of the unfair trade practice; 116 and (2) imposing a duty on the foreign exporters equal to

113 GATT, supranote 6, art. VI, para. 2 (emphasis added).
114 Id. art. VI, para. 3 (emphasis added).
11 See supra Section 2.1.3.
116 See supra Section 21.1.1.
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that amount' 1 7 The duty raises the costs of the companies by the
same amount as the countervailed subsidies lower them. As a resuit, those companies' profit margins are brought back down to a
"fair" level. In addition to GATT, the U.S. AD/CVD laws also recognize this quantitative limitation on the amount of a remedy implemented in response to dumping or subsidization.118
The principle behind this "cap" is that a duty of one dollar
charged against a foreign company offsets the effects of a onedollar subsidy received by that company (or, in the case of dumping where no subsidization is taking place, a one-dollar differential
between the U.S. sales price and the normal value) of the dumped
product. As the statute prescribes, the remedy must be equal to the
harm actually being caused by the unfair dumping or subsidization. A duty in the amount of two dollars, therefore, would be excessive: the first dollar would equalize the balance of fairness between the subsidized company and its U.S. competitors, but the
second dollar would tip the scale in the other direction, giving the
U.S. companies an unfair advantage. Recalling the economic assumption noted above (i.e., one dollar paid as a CDSOA offset has
the same effect as a one dollar duty charged a subsidized foreign
exporter), it must also be true, then, that a duty of one dollar plus a
CDSOA distribution of one dollar would be excessive. The onedollar duty would equalize the balance of fairness between the
subsidized company and its U.S. competitors, but the one-dollar
CDSOA offset would tip the scale in the other direction, giving the
U.S. companies an unfair advantage.
This analysis might be challenged, however, because of another
premise on which it is based. That premise is that the margin of
dumping or of subsidization is equal to the harm actually caused
by the dumping or subsidization that occurs. What result, proponents of CDSOA might ask, if the duties charged against a foreign
company do not offset the harm caused by the situation of subsidization or dumping being addressed. Given the overwhelming
complexity inherent in the dumping and subsidy margin determinations, this could be true for at least two reasons: (1) the DOC
117 See id.
118 See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671(a) (West 1999) (providing that the amount of a
countervailing duty shall be "equal to the amount of the net countervailable subsidy...") (emphasis added); id. § 1673 (providing that the amount of an antidumping duty shall be "equal to the amount by which the normal value exceeds
the export price (or the constructed export price) for the merchandise....") (emphasis added).
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and/or the ITC could simply misapply the procedures for calculating the margin of dumping or subsidization; or (2) the procedures by which the DOC and ITC calculate the margin of dumping
or subsidization could be inherently ill-suited for quantifying accurately the actual harm caused by the dumping or subsidization.
If either of these is the case, it is possible that the antidumping
and countervailing duties that result from those determinations are
too low. If the underlying duties are low, then perhaps proponents
of CDSOA would be1 9 correct in asserting that, even when the remedial effects of CDSOA distributions are added to the remedial
effects of the underlying duties, the total remedy still does not exceed the amount necessary to offset the harm caused by the
dumping or subsidization.
Not likely. It is quite possible that the procedures used to calculate the margin of dumping or subsidization are inherently illsuited for quantifying accurately the actual harm caused by the
dumping or subsidization. In fact, it is quite likely that this is true,
as Section 3.2 of this Comment explains in detail. However, as
Section 3.2. of this Comment also explains, the biases built into the
U.S. AD/CVD laws tend to inflate, rather than deflate, the margin of
dumping and/or subsidization relative to the harm actually being
caused by those conditions. To the extent the underlying duties
are miscalculated, they are far more likely to be higher than the actual harm being remedied than lower than the actual harm being
remedied. Much more importantly, even if the underlying duties
are too low to offset the harm being remedied, the miscalculation
would have to be enormous in order for the extra "kick" of the
CDSOA distributions to be warranted.
This problem is easily understood in mathematical terms.
Where A equals the amount of the underlying duties; B equals the
amount of the CDSOA distributions; and C equals the amount of
the harm actually caused by the dumping and/or subsidization,
the CDSOA distributions are valid' 20 only if:

119 The subjunctive tense is used here because the Author is not aware of any
proponents of CDSOA who have actually addressed the question whether
CDSOA distributions are quantitatively justified.
when combined with the underlying du120 The distributions are "valid" if,
ties such as they are, the total benefit to the U.S. companies who receive them
does not exceed (ie., is less-than-or-equal-to ("9")) the actual harm caused by the
dumping or subsidization. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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A+B<C
The economic assumption stated above (that a one-dollar
CDSOA distribution has the same remedial effect as a one-dollar
duty charged to a subsidized or dumping foreign exporter) says, in
mathematical terms, that A equals B. Therefore, this equation can
be re-written as:
Ax2<C
or:
A<.5xC
In other words, the CDSOA distributions are valid only if the
underlying duties themselves offset no more than half of the harm
actually caused by the dumping or subsidization. This would require, obviously, that the DOC miscalculates the margin of dumping or subsidization by fifty percent This makes clear why it is not
necessary for the economic assumption explained above to be spoton accurate. 121 To test the ample margin of error, let us assume
momentarily that the assumption is wrong, and that one dollar in
CDSOA distributions has an effect equal to only a fifty-cent ($0.50)
duty charged to the foreign exporter. The prognosis for CDSOA
looks better, but not by much. In that case, the calculations by the
DOC and ITC still would have to be inaccurate by at least thirtythree percent' 2 2 In other words, the CDSOA distributions would
be valid only if the underlying duties compensate for no more than
two-thirds of the harm actually caused by the dumping or subsidization. Let us assume, alternatively, that the economic assumption
is incorrect in the opposite direction and, in fact, one dollar in
CDSOA distributions has an effect equal to a duty in the amount of
one dollar and fifty cents ($1.50). In this case, CDSOA distributions
would be valid only if DOC miscalculates the margin of dumping
or subsidization by sixty-six percent. 23
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
Under this alternative assumption-Le., B = .5 x A, rather than B = A-the
calculationwouldbe as follows: A + B <C, sol.5xA < C, so A <.66x C.
123 Under this alternative assumption-i.e., B = 1.5 x A, rather than B = Athe calculation would be as follows: A + B < C, so 3 x A < C, so A < .33 x C
121

122

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss2/6

2002]

CONTINUED DUMPING & SUBSIDY OFFSETACT

443

Assuming, therefore, that the underlying duties come anywhere near compensating the petitioning U.S. companies for the
harms actually caused by the dumping or subsidization being
remedied, CDSOA distributions overcompensate the recipients,
placing them at an advantage vis-a-vis the companies who paid the
underlying duties.
4.2.1.2.

"Continued Dumping. .

." or Not,

CDSOA

DistributionsDo Not Satisfy the Investigation
Requirement of GATT and the U.S. Laws
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that, absent an error of
inconceivable proportions in the calculation of the underlying duties, CDSOA distributions are excessive because, when added to
the amount of the underlying duties, the total advantage bestowed
on the U.S. companies who receive the distributions is well in excess of the actual harm done to those companies by the dumping
and/or subsidization being remedied. One could get around this
analysis by arguing that CDSOA distributions should not be added
to the underlying duties at all, because although both the offsets
and the underlying duties are actions against dumping and/or
subsidization, they are responses to distinct situations of dumping
or subsidization.
The name of the Act itself seems to encourage this distinction,
and some supporters of the Act argue that the additional remedial
measure is necessary in order to deal with circumvention of, and
even blatant disregard for, antidumping and countervailing duties
imposed by the United States.124 This argument, in effect, justifies
CDSOA distributions as a "second phase" of remediation: whereas
the underlying duties may offset fully the harmful effects of the
initial situation of dumping or subsidization in response to which
the duties were imposed, if any dumping or subsidization contin124 See, e.g., Press Release, Santorum Applauds Inclusion of Measure to Protect Steel Industry in Agriculture Appropriations Bill (Oct. 11, 2000), at
http://santorum.senate.gov/press/001011.htn-l [hereinafter Santorum Press Release]. According to Senator Rick Santorun:

We cannot afford to sacrifice the U.S. steel industry and thousands of
American jobs in an attempt to prop up faulty foreign economies....
The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act enforces our trade laws
and protects U.S. workers from the harmful effects of foreign competitors
who disregard the law and simply consider antidumping and countervailing duties a cost of doing business.
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ues after the antidumping or countervailing duty order is entered,
that "continued" dumping or subsidization causes a distinct harm
that must be remedied.125 The CDSOA distributions offset this additional and distinct harm, and so they are not limited by the "cap"
as described above.126
This argument simply misunderstands the way antidumping
and countervailing duties work as a remedy to dumping and subsidization.127 The fact that dumping or subsidization continue to
occur after the underlying duties are imposed does not mean that
the harm caused by that dumping or subsidization has not been
remedied in full. The purpose of the underlying duties is not to
extinguish the dumping or subsidization in response to which they
are imposed; rather, it is to offset the effects of that dumping or subsidization. In fact, if the dumping or subsidization does cease, so
does the duty, 28 as well it should. After all, if the dumping or subsidization ceases, then, afortiori,so do the effects of the dumping or
subsidization, and hence, the need for a response to those effects.
Another problem in considering CDSOA distributions as a
remedy for a distinct situation of "continued" subsidization or
dumping is posed by the investigation requirement of Article VI,
the ADA, and the ASCM. With regard to the imposition of an an125 See, e.g., Press Release, Regula Fights Weakening of U.S. Trade Laws in the
World Trade Organization (Feb. 9, 2001), at http://wwwahouse.gov/regula
/pr020901.htm ("The U.S. steel industry and its workers are suffering from the
impact of unfair imports. We must strongly support our laws that combat these
unfair imports including the recent change in our law that protects against continued dumping of imports even after duties have been imposed .. ."') (quoting
Rep. Ralph Regula).
126 The limit on the amount of CDSOA distributions under this alternative
conceptualization, would be expressed mathematically not as: A + B < C, where C
equals the total harm to be remedied, but rather as: A < C, and B < C2, where C1
equals the total harm from the initial situation of dumping, and C2 equals the total
harm resulting from the "continued" dumping or subsidization.
127 Although not discussed in detail, Article VI, para. 5 may preclude this
conception of CDSOA offsets at the outset. See GATT, supra note 6, art. VI, para. 5.
Although the offsets are neither antidumping duties nor countervailing "duties"
as such, this prohibition could be interpreted to imply a broader prohibition on the
imposition of more than one remedy.
128 See, e.g., 19 C.F.R § 351.222(b)(A) (2001) (providing for the revocation of
an antidumping duty order where "all exporters and producers covered at the
time of revocation by the order... have sold the subject merchandise at not less
than normal value for a period of at least three consecutive years... "); see also id. §
351.218(a) (providing for the revocation of an order where the Secretary determines that "dumping or countervailable subsidies would [not] be likely to continue or resume if [the] order were revoked").
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tidumping or countervailing duty, Article VI of GATT provides the
following:
(a) No contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping or
countervailing duty on the importation of any product of
the territory of another contracting party unless it determines that the effect of the dumping or subsidization, as the
case may be, is such as to cause or threaten material injury
to an established domestic industry, or is such as to retard
29
materially the establishment of a domestic industry.1
Similar requirements regarding factual support for antidumping and countervailing duties are contained in the ADA and the
ASCM.130 Conceived as distinct from the underlying duties, the
CDSOA offsets cannot "bootstrap" the investigation that supported the underlying duties. This seems quite obvious where the
offsets take place a year or more after the assessment of the underlying duties, but it also would hold true where the offsets take
place immediately after the underlying duties are assessed.131
There must be a dedicated investigation into the extent and nature
of the particular situation of dumping or subsidization to which
the CDSOA offsets purportedly respond. If a proponent of
CDSOA were to argue that the offsets respond to a different situation of dumping or subsidization in order to avoid the two remedies being combined and therefore deemed excessive, it must deal
with the consequences of that construction. Those consequences,
of course, are fatal.
129

GATT, supra note 6, art. VI, para. 6(a).

130 See supra Section 2.1.2; see also ADA, supra note 31, art. 3, para. 3.1.

A determination of injury for purposes of Artide VI of GATT 1994 shall
be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of
both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped
imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the
consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such
products.
ASCM, supra note 32, art. 15, para. 15.1 (using exactly the same language as Article 3, paragraph 3.1 of the ADA).
'3'
See generally19 U.S.C.A. § 1675c(c) (West Supp. 2001) (providing that offsets pursuant to the Act "shall be made not later than sixty days after the first day
of a fiscal year from duties assessed during the preceding fiscal year"). Depending on when during the fiscal year the duty is imposed, the offsets could be distributed from zero to fourteen months later.
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The only way CDSOA distributions can satisfy the investigation requirement is if they are considered as a response to the same
situation of dumping or subsidization as the underlying duties.
Those duties, presumably, resulted from an investigation that
complied with the provisions of the ADA and the ASCM, and so
that investigation is, effectively, bootstrapped onto the CDSOA
distributions. Considered this way, however, the CDSOA distributions must be added to the amount of the underlying duty in
order to evaluate the amount of the total remedial action being
taken to that single situation of dumping or subsidization. By
adding "A + B," the total remedy almost certainly will be greater
than "C," as it were; that is, the total remedy almost certainly will
be excessive in light of the actual harm caused by the dumping or
subsidization.
The combination of the "cap" on the total remedy and the investigation requirements puts CDSOA between a rock and a hard
place. CDSOA distributions cannot be considered separable from
the underlying duties for the purpose of the maximum allowable
amount requirement but inseparable from the underlying duties
for the purpose of the investigation requirement.
4.2.2.

Evaluating CDSOA as a Subsidy

An alternative approach in challenging CDSOA, reflected in
the request for consultations cited above, is to consider CDSOA
offsets as subsidies. The United States likely would not argue that
CDSOA offsets are subsidies-that would be making half of the
opponents' argument for them.132 Besides, characterizing the offsets as subsidies lacks the political appeal of wielding the Act as a
trade remedy, defending righteous U.S. markets against "faulty
foreign economies."133 Nevertheless, the argument already has
been made by opponents of CDSOA.134
As an initial matter, before addressing the difficulties posed by
the definition and specificity requirements of the ASCM, 135 which
relate to whether a subsidy is a prohibited subsidy, it is not selfevident that CDSOA offsets to U.S. companies are characterized
132 But not the whole argument. Even if it were agreed that the offsets are
subsidies, the challenging parties would still have to show that they are a prohibited subsidy. See generally ASCM, supranote 32.
123 Santorum Press Release, supra note 124.
134 See supra note 106.
135 See infra Sections 4.221.1. & 4.22.1.2.
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properly as "subsidies" to begin with. Most significantly, it can be
argued that these offsets are not paid to U.S. companies by the U.S.
government. Because the ASCM prohibits subsidies provided "by
a government or any public body within the territory of a Member,"136 therefore, payments originating from foreign countries
might not be covered by the prohibition.
Although the offsets distributed to U.S. companies under
CDSOA are funded by foreign companies, those offsets should be
considered payments by the U.S. government Even supposing,
arguendo, that these funds were not to be paid out of a U.S. Treasury account,137 but were to be paid directly to the U.S. companies
or to an escrow account administered by an agent appointed by
those companies or by the Treasury Department, the role of the
U.S. government would be more than sufficient. First, complainant
companies would not be entitled to these funds at all were it not
for the largess with which the drafters of CDSOA apparently were
overcome in October of 2000. Second, even if CDSOA offsets were
not made directly by the government, the "deflection" or "laundering" effected by this arrangement would fall within Article 1,
paragraph 1.1(a)(2), which incorporates the definitional portion of
Article XVI of GATT.1
4.2.2.1.

ASCM Requirements RegardingProhibitedSubsidies

4.2.2.1.1.

Definition of "Subsidy"

"Subsidy" is defined in Article 1 of the ASCM as follows:
For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be
deemed to exist if: (a)(1) there is a financial contribution by
a government or any public body within the territory of a
136
'37

ASCM, supranote 32, art. 1, para. 1.1(a)(1).
See 19. U.S.C.A. §§ 1675c(e)(1), 1675c(e)(2) (West Supp. 2001) (providing

that "the Commissioner [of Customs] shall establish in the Treasury a special ac-

count" for each antidumping or countervailing duty imposed, and "shall deposit
into the special accounts, all antidumping or countervailing duties... that are assessed... under the.., order with respect to which the account was established").
133 See ASCM, supra note 32, art. 1, para. 1.1(a)(2) (including in the definition
"any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994").
GATT Art. XVI, para. 1, in turn, relates to "any form of income or price support,
which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to
reduce imports of any product into, its territory" (emphasis added).
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Member (referred to in this Agreement as "government"),
i.e. where: (i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); (ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is
foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax
credits); (iii) a government provides goods or services other
than general infrastructure, or purchases goods; (iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of
the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (ii) above which
would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments; or (a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT
1994; and (b) a benefit is thereby conferred (footnote omitted).139
At first glance, CDSOA offsets do not fit squarely within these
guidelines. A "direct transfer of funds" seems to imply that the
government is giving its own money to the recipients. Likewise,
the government is not making "payments to a funding mechanism"-the payments are borne by the countries who pay the underlying duties. The closest match appears to be "revenue that is
otherwise due is foregone."
It could be argued, based on the parenthetical example, that the
foregoing of revenue otherwise due is intended to involve only
revenue due from the benefiting parties.140 WTO panel decisions interpreting this provision, however, suggest otherwise. These decisions have focused not on why or how the revenue is "due" the
government, but rather on the "financial contribution" inherent in
the government's act of forfeiture itself. In Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, the panel indicated that revenue
from customs duties is not excluded:

139 See ASCM, supra note 32, art. 1, para. 1.1.
140 As would be the case, for example, if the government waived the obligation of company X to pay a tax on X's income.
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With respect to the first element, a financial contribution
under paragraph 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement exists
when government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected. In the ordinary sense, 'government
revenue' is raised through internal taxes and other charges
including customs duties. Since government revenue is foregone
when a customs duty is waived, the Duty Waiver amounts to a
financial contribution.141
As to the question whether revenue that is foregone is "otherwise due," the panel found in "United States-Tax Treatment for
Foreign Sales Corporations," that
In accordance with its ordinary meaning,... 'otherwise
due' [refers] to the situation that would prevail but for the
measures in question. It is thus a matter of determining
whether, absent such measures, there would be a higher tax
liability. In our view, this means that a panel, in considering
whether revenue foregone is "otherwise due", must examine the situation that would exist but for the measure in
question. Under this approach, the question presented in
this dispute is whether, ifthe FSC scheme did not exist, revenue would be due which isforegone by reason of that scheme.142
The question, therefore, is whether, if CDSOA did not exist,
revenue from antidumping and countervailing duties imposed by
the U.S. government would be due the U.S. government. In case
there were any question, the statement made by Senator DeWine

141 WTO Dispute Panel Report on Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the
Automotive Industry, 2000 WL 282504, at *136, para.6.461 (Feb. 11, 2000) (emphasis added); see also WTO Dispute Panel Report on Indonesia-Certain Measures
Affecting the Automobile Industry, 1998 WL 375971, at *67, para. 5.139 (July 2,
1998) ("Under the 1993 incentive programme, the Government foregoes or does
not collect revenue that is otherwise due by granting an exemption from or reduction in the rate of import duties on automotive parts and components. Thus,
there is the requisite financial contribution by the Government").
142 WTO Dispute Panel Report on the United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," 1999 WL 973750 at *280, para. 7.45 (Oct. 8, 1999) (emphasis added).
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upon introducing the bill offers proof positive that this is the
case. 43
4.2.2.1.2.

Specificity

The specificity requirement in GATT is not unique. U.S.
AD/CVD laws contain a similar requirement 44 The purpose of a
specificity requirement is to "ensure that many of the familiar activities of governments are not characterized as 'subsidies."145 Article 8, paragraph 8.1 of the ASCM provides that subsidies are not
actionable unless they are specific within the meaning of Article
2.146
Article 2 sets out the principles with which to determine
whether a particular subsidy is specific.
Article 2, paragraph 2.1(a) provides that a subsidy is deemed to
be specific "[w]here the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises." 147 Article 2, paragraph
2.1(b) provides that a subsidy shall not be deemed specific:
Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to
which the granting authority operates, establishes objective
criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for, and the
amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not exist, provided
that the eligibility is automatic and that such criteria and
conditions are strictly adhered to (footnote omitted).148

143 See supra note 41 ("Currently, revenues raised through import duties and
fines go to the U.S. Treasury. Under our bill, duties and fines would be transferred to injured U.S. companies as compensation for damages caused by dumping or subsidization.") (quoting Sen. DeWine).
144 See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5A) (West 1999); 19 C.F.R1 § 351.502 (2001).
145 Alan 0. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89
COLum. L. REv. 199, 204 (1989); see also ASCM, supra note 32, art 8, para. 8.1 n 23
("It is recognized that government assistance for various purposes is widely provided by Members and that the mere fact that such assistance may not qualify for
non-actionable treatment under the provisions of this Article does not in itself re-

strict the ability of Members to provide such assistance.").
146 See ASCM, supra note 32, art. 8, para. 8.1.
147 Id. art. 2, para. 2.1(a).
148 Id. art. 2, par. 2.1(b) (footnote omitted). In addition, this provision requires that "The criteria or conditions must be clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other official document, so as to be capable of verification." Id.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss2/6

2002]

CONTINUED DUMPING & SUBSIDY OFFSETACT

451

Because CDSOA does not expressly limit eligibility for receipt
of the offsets to a particular industry or group of industries, and
because the requirements for eligibility are laid out fairly clearly in
the law,149 these two guidelines cut against construing CDSOA offsets as specific subsidies. Despite this, CDSOA offsets could be
construed as specific if they are sufficiently similar to one of the
illustrative examples of export subsidies provided in Annex I to the
ASCM.150 Regardless of the other provisions regarding specificity,
if CDSOA offsets can be considered any one of these examples,
they are conclusively established as actionable.151 Unfortunately,
CDSOA offsets are distinct from all of these examples in that they
are not contingent in any way on exportation by the recipients of
2
the funds. 5
The best bet for an opponent of CDSOA offsets with regard to
the specificity requirement is paragraph 2.1(c) of Article 2. This
"catch-all" provision provides that even where neither 2.2(a) nor
2.2(b) apply, a subsidy may still be specifically based on "other
factors."' 5 3 These factors are: (1) "use of a subsidy programme by
a limited number of certain enterprises," (2) "predominant use by
certain enterprises," (3) "the granting of disproportionately large
amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises," and (4) "the manner in
which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority in
the decision to grant a subsidy." 54 Based on the sheer number of
AD/CVD cases brought by the U.S. steel industry, an argument
can be made that CDSOA offsets are specific to the U.S. steel industry because the steel industry uses U.S. AD/CVD laws dispro-

149

See supra Section 2Z

150 See ASCM, supranote 32, Annex I.
'5' See GATT Dispute Panel Report on Brazil-Export Financing Programme
for Aircraft, 2000 WL 668957, at "14, para 6.31 (May 9, 2000) (explaining that "a
Member may establish that a measure is a prohibited export subsidy by going directly to the Illustrative List, without first demonstrating that a measure falls
within the scope of Article 3.1(a)", and noting further that "[t]his is confirmed
from the words 'subsidies contingent... upon export performance, including
those illustrated in Annex I").
152 This distinction is not fatal, because the list in Annex I is merely illustrative; it is not exhaustive of all types of subsidies that are actionable. See id. at 13,
para. 6.30.
'53 See ASCM, supra note 32, art. 2, para. ZI(c).
'54 Id.
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portionately, and therefore would benefit disproportionately from
the offsets made under CDSOA.155
This catch-all provision in the ASCM corresponds to 19 U.S.C. §
1677(5A). In particular, section 1677(5A) provides that a foreign
subsidy is specific if (1) "[a]n enterprise or industry is a predominant user of the subsidy;"156 or (2) "An enterprise or industry receives a disproportionately large amount of the subsidy."15 7 Ironically, these provisions seem to apply to CDSOA even more
squarely than the ASCM provision. As mentioned above, approximately forty-three percent of all antidumping and countervailing duty cases brought since 1980 have been brought by the
U.S. steel industry.
4.3. Evaluating CDSOA as a Matter of Trade Policy
This Section lists briefly some of the ways in which CDSOA
conflicts with U.S. AD/CVD laws and policies, irrespective of its
implications for U.S. obligations under GATT 1994 and the WTO
Agreement.
4.3.1.

CDSOA DiscouragesFormationof Suspension Agreements

As an important supplement to the negative incentives provided by U.S. AD/CVD duties, companies often have entered into
"Suspension Agreements" which resolve their disputes without
the interference of U.S. regulatory authorities and without the economic and political effects of duties. Unfortunately, the new Act
promises an extremely strong financial reward to U.S. companies
who are willing to initiate AD/CVD investigations. This incentive
undoubtedly will dissuade some domestic companies from negotiating a suspension agreement where, without this incentive, such
an agreement would have been reached. 5 8 In addition, this incen-

155 Of the approximately 1000 Antidumping and Countervailing duty cases
that were brought by U.S. companies since January 1, 1980, approximately 430
were brought by U.S. steel companies and/or with respect to steel products. See
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases Initiated Since January 1, 1980, available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov
/stats/pet-inithtn.
156 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii)(Il) (West 1999).
157 Id. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii)(III).
158 146 CONG. REC. H9699 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Rep. Kolbe).
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live has serious implications for the integrity of the administration
of the U.S. laws themselves. 159
4.3.2.

CDSOA Will EncourageRetaliatoryActions by A/VTO

Members
One of the most significant problems threatened by CDSOA is
the possibility of retaliatory duties or statutory measures. The legitimacy of such retaliatory remedies in response to CDSOA offsets
depends, at least theoretically, on the proper characterization of the
offsets as countervailable subsidies. These offsets are properly
characterized as countervailable subsidies, however, and the concerns expressed by many proponents of the Act are wellfounded. 60
4.3.3.

CDSOA Betrays the PrinciplesBehind U.S. AD/CVD Laws

Most significantly, CDSOA betrays the pre-existing U.S.
AD/CVD laws. First, it requires that U.S. AD/CVD laws actually
be administered incorrectly.16' Second, it will cause more antidumping investigations than intended by the Tariff Act by encouraging false representations of support for the duties sought by
complaining companies. As explained above,162 an antidumping
investigation will not proceed unless it is demonstrated that the
complainant companies represent a sufficient portion of the domestic industry allegedly harmed by the dumping, and unless a
sufficient portion of the industry shows its support for the investigation. This "standing" requirement ensures that the petition is
being brought "on behalf of" a domestic industry 63 as the law says

159

This effect, which relates to standing, is discussed below. See infra Section

4.3.4.
160

See, e.g., supra note 158.

Subsidization of industry by any government which is a member of the
World Trade Organization violates the WTO Agreement on Subsidies on
Countervailing Measures. The U.S. government supported this Agreement because we sought to eliminate foreign subsidies which undercut
the ability of U.S. industry to compete abroad. Payment of AD/CVD
duties violates the Agreement which could lead to retaliatory tariffs
against innocent U.S. exporters.

Id.
161
162
163

See supra Section 4.2.1.1.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text
See Murray, supranote 82, at 27.
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must be the case.1M Because of the possibility of financial reward
for companies who participate in, or express support for, the investigation, CDSOA will result in investigations that, without such
an incentive, would be terminated for lack of standing.
5.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the U.S. AD/CVD laws is to address the ill effects of foreign dumping and subsidies. As explained above, 165 the
underlying duties are designed to provide that remedy in full, and
so the CDSOA offsets represent a remedy over-and-above what is
necessary and permissible. The decidedly disagreeable result is
that the U.S. AD/CVD laws provide an appropriate remedy to unfair trade practices only if the laws are administered incompetently.166 Senator DeWine tries to offer a limited defense against
this criticism when he argues that "foreign producers have done
the math. They have made a calculated decision that the risk of
duties is a price they are willing to pay in return for the higher
global market share they have gained by chipping away at the size

and strength of our nation's steel industry."

67

Even assuming that the duties imposed under the U.S.
AD/CVD laws really are inadequate to prevent the harm caused
by subsidization of products imported into the United States, Article VI of GATT 1994, the ADA, and the ASCM require that any
remedy be imposed only after an adequate investigation demonstrates material injury or a threat thereof. The precision required,
or possible for that matter, in determining to what extent domestic
industries are injured by dumping or subsidization is the subject of
much debate. It seems, however, that skipping the investigation
phase altogether and simply imposing a "double hit"168 in every
situation falls at least slightly below the bar.

164 See 19 U.S.C.A_ § 1761a(b)(1) (West 1999) ("A countervailing duty proceeding shall be initiated whenever an interested party... files a petition with the
administering authority, on behalf of an industry, which alleges the elements necessary for the imposition of the duty...
165 See supra notes in Section 4.21.
166 See id.
167 See supra note 41.
168 See id. ("Under our bill, foreign steel producers would get a double hit
from dumping- they would have to pay a duty, and in turn, see that duty go directly to aid U.S. steel producers.").
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In support of the new Act, Senator DeWine, Senator Byrd,
and advocates of CDSOA generally, have asserted only that preCDSOA U.S. AD/CVD laws inadequately addressed the harms
caused to U.S. industries by dumping and subsidization. 169 That
assertion may be true, but it is nothing more than a articulation of a
problem. Regardless of the particular requirements of GATT, the
WTO Agreements, or the U.S. AD/CVD laws for that matter,
common sense dictates that the severity of the solution should be
commensurate with the severity of the problem. CDSOA makes
the assumption that the amount of the remedy provided by
CDSOA is commensurate with the residual injury caused by the
unfair trade practices after the underlying duties are assessed.
The foregoing discussion has shown that this assumption is a
strikingly bad one. While having nothing more than an articulation of the problem and a bad assumption as the basis for a possible solution to that problem is an understandable situation from
which to start formulating a law, it is a heck of a place to be eighteen months after the law has entered into force.

Their factual assertion, essentially, is that pre-CDSOA U.S. AD/CVD laws
inadequately addressed the harms caused to U.S. industries by dumping and subsidization.
169
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